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ABSTRACT 
It is highly desirable for an allocation of goods to be efficient. However, one might also deem it 
important that an allocation gives individuals what they deserve. This paper investigates whether it 
is possible for an allocation to be both efficient and give people what they deserve. It will first of 
all consider comparative desert, and conclude that it is possible to satisfy both desiderata. It will 
then consider absolute desert by integrating Shelly Kagan’s work on desert and economic theory. 
The conclusion will be that there are potential conflicts between absolute desert and efficiency. The 
paper will then examine how to select the best compromise between the two values, considering 
several different conceptions of absolute desert.  
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Il est fortement désirable pour une allocation des biens d’être efficiente. Pourtant, on peut aussi 
juger important que l’allocation donne aux individus ce qu’ils méritent. Ce papier examine s’il est 
possible pour une allocation d’être à la fois efficiente et de donner aux individus ce qu’ils méritent. 
Tout d’abord, nous considérons des mérites comparatifs et nous concluons qu’il est possible de 
satisfaire les deux exigences. Ensuite nous considérons le mérite absolu en intégrant les travaux de 
Shelly Kagan sur le mérite et la théorie économique. Nous concluons qu’il existe des conflits 
potentiels entre le mérite absolu et l’efficience. Le papier examine alors comment sélectionner le 
meilleur compromis entre les deux valeurs, considérant plusieurs conceptions du mérite absolu.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of desert has, in recent years, enjoyed increasing attention from those studying 
questions of distribution and justice.1 Most of the attention has centred on clarifying the concept 
of desert and considering its normative appeal. Almost no attention has focused on the 
relationship between desert and distributive efficiency. This is problematic.2 However attractive 
distributing according to desert might be, distributing efficiently also has immense appeal. For 
that reason it is important to consider how desert and efficiency relate. Are there allocations that 
are optimal from both the perspective of efficiency and of desert? If so, how do we find them? If 
not, and there are potential conflicts between the two, which allocation represents the best 
compromise between the two desiderata? As both desert and efficiency are desirable in a 
distribution, we require some way of marrying the two ideals or at least of making trade-offs 
between them. This is why I wish to examine the relationship between desert and efficiency. 
 
In order to do so, a theoretical framework is required that allows us to think about both concepts 
simultaneously. In this paper I seek to produce such a framework by integrating recent work on 
the concept of desert, with a special focus on the work of Shelly Kagan, into the economic theory 
of distributive efficiency. Given Kagan’s rigorous work on desert, it is quite simple to integrate it 
into standard economic theories. This allows us to see the relationship between desert and 
efficiency. It will allow us to consider which distributions are most appealing from the 
perspectives of the two desiderata.  
 
I will start off by making a few preliminary remarks about desert and efficiency, before 
considering how they relate. Desert comes in two varieties: fundamentally comparative and 
absolute. The first part of the paper will focus on the former conception of desert. The second part 
of the paper will consider the latter conception, which is the one Kagan adopts. I will investigate 
if desert and efficiency can both be satisfied, and which allocation represents the best 
compromise between the two values if they cannot both be satisfied. 
 
DESERT AND EFFICIENCY 
 
Desert is a particular ideal of distributive justice. It starts from the basic intuition that individuals 
who do good things should prosper, while those who do bad things should suffer. This is a 
common intuition that seems to be a prominent feature in many people’s moral landscape. Many 
people feel that there should be a certain harmony between the nature of individuals’ actions on 
the one hand, and how well they are doing on the other. I wish to focus on a fairly specific 
conception of desert, which may be summarised in the desert thesis3: 
                                            
1 For example, see two recent edited volumes. See Serena Olsaretti, Desert and Justice, Mind 
Association Occasional Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). See also Louis P. Pojman and 
Owen McLeod, What Do We Deserve? : A Reader on Justice and Desert (New York ; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
2 Some work on comparative desert has implicitly considered questions of feasibility, which are 
in certain respect related to questions of efficiency. However, there has been no explicit 
discussion of the relationship between desert and distributive efficiency.   
3 See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1998), p.274.  
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Individuals who make choices or undertake actions that are deemed good should be well 
off, while individuals who make choices or undertake actions that are deemed bad should 
be badly off. 
 
The concept of desert is a notion that governs the distribution of particular goods and forms of 
treatment. Claims of desert feature a person on whose behalf the claim is made, a specification of 
what is claimed and a reason that supports the claim, the desert-base.4 However, for a desert 
claim to be valid, certain conditions must be met. 
 
First of all, it seems obvious that the reasons one might give in order to support the assertion that 
a person is deserving all point to facts about that person. However, not every characteristic of the 
individual will do in this context. For example, most will agree that the fact that someone has 
blue eyes and white skin does not make him deserving. Why is this the case? It seems that when 
considering the characteristics that individuals may have, the ones that may be plausibly cited in 
support of desert are the ones they possess in a morally significant sense, i.e. the ones for which 
they are responsible.5  
 
Desert also has a second requirement; in order to be deserving the desert-base must be appraised 
as good or bad; it must be something that is valued positively or negatively. This leads to a 
second restriction on potential desert-bases, the appraisive requirement. It holds that desert-bases 
must be appraised as good or bad.  When a desert-base is positively appraised, it makes its 
possessor deserving of a larger distributive share while a negatively appraised desert-base makes 
its possessor deserving of a smaller share.  
 
A final restriction on potential desert-bases, the proportionality requirement, holds that there must 
be some congruence between how the desert-base is appraised and the size of the associated 
adjustment in one’s distributive share. If a desert-base is appraised as very good, it justifies its 
possessor being very well off, while more moderately appraised desert-bases should be associated 
with smaller distributive shares.  
 
Rewarding according to desert has great intuitive plausibility. Imagine two universes with 
identical numbers of saints, i.e. individuals who do good things, and sinners, i.e. individuals who 
do bad things, and with identical amounts of burdens and benefits to be distributed. In one 
universe the saints have the benefits and the sinners have the burdens, while in the other the saints 
have the burdens and the sinners the benefits.6 Many people feel that there is something wrong in 
the latter case, but not in the former. Similarly one might think that if the moderately good are 
doing exceedingly well or the moderately bad are exceedingly badly off, something is amiss. In 
short, many people feel that there should be a certain harmony between the nature of individuals 
and their actions on the one hand, and how well they are doing on the other.  
                                            
4 See J Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," Nomos Vi; Justice, eds. C.J.  Friedrich and J.W. 
Chapman (New York, NY: Atherton, 1963). 
5 Of course, this raises many questions concerning the nature of responsibility, and in particular 
whether or not the operation of luck undermines desert. For an overview of this debate, see 
Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market : A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). However, this question need not detain us here, as I will assume that 
there are things for which individuals are responsible and which might render them deserving. 
6 See for the origin of this example W.D. Ross, "What Things Are Good?," What Do We 
Deserve?, eds. L  Pojman and O McLeod (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 59. 
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In particular, I believe that justice as desert has two characteristics that make it appealing. First of 
all, desert allows for some individuals to be better off than others because of their actions and 
choices.  This allows desert to cater to the common intuition that individuals’ distributive share 
should be linked to those characteristics that they are responsible for. Secondly, desert distributes 
according to a common conception of the good. It allows societies to determine what sort of 
behaviour they find valuable, and reward accordingly. Justice as desert is one of the few theories 
of justice that incorporates some notion of the good, and in this way appeals to the value of 
community. While liberals7 who see neutrality as the first virtue will find this offensive, those 
who are of a more communitarian persuasion will find desert appealing.8 
 
The above has been the briefest of sketches of justice as desert. However, what is relevant for 
current purposes is that desert specifies a particular pattern of allocation among individuals that it 
deems just. Throughout this paper I will assume that desert is given exogenously, i.e. that desert 
simply specifies a particular distribution that is independent of other variables in the model.  
 
Distributive efficiency requires that the benefits available for distribution be allocated in such a 
way that it is impossible to improve one person’s position without making anyone worse off. In 
this context I am using the idea of Pareto efficiency. An allocation is Pareto efficient if no Pareto 
improvements are possible, i.e. if it is impossible to improve anyone’s distributive position 
without making anyone else’s position worse. Put loosely, it requires that there be no waste in an 
allocation. For if there are resources that are not allocated, then they may be used to improve the 
position of individuals without making anyone else worse off. However, if all resources are 
allocated then it is impossible to improve one person’s position without taking from others. This 
is also an appealing characteristic for an allocation to possess. For, if it were possible to make 
some individuals better off, at no cost to anyone, not doing so seems irrational. We would be 
wasting resources, resources that could be used to improve people’s lives. In other words, 
efficiency is appealing because it maximises social welfare. It does not waste any of society’s 
limited resources, but ensures that they are used to benefit people as much as possible.  
 
Efficiency is easily modelled. Let us assume that a society knows only one generic type of 
benefits, to be distributed among A and B, and that there is a fixed amount of 12 units available. 
There are many ways of distributing these 12 units in an efficient fashion. They are represented 
by the diagonal line, the Frontier, in Figure 1. 
   
                                            
7 For Example, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980), Chapter 1. 
8 For example, Michael Sandel, a prominent communitarian, has criticised the work of John 
Rawls for ignoring the importance of the good. See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Desert 
does not suffer from this problem.  
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Figure 1 
 
Every point on the Frontier represents an efficient way of allocating the 12 units of benefits 
among A and B. For, if we are on the Frontier, all goods are allocated, and it is not possible to 
make one of the individuals better off without making the other worse off. By contrast, 
allocations within the Frontier are inefficient, because not all goods are allocated. The unallocated 
goods might be used to make individuals better off without redistribution. The slope of the line is 
–1, as taking 1 unit of benefits from A allows us to give 1 unit of benefits to B, preserving an 
allocation without waste.  
 
COMPARATIVE DESERT 
 
Some theorists of desert have conceived of desert in exclusively comparative terms.9 They hold 
that desert requires that the benefits individuals have allocated to them obey a particular 
proportional harmony. This proportion is determined by desert, i.e. by how virtuous individuals 
have been. For example, comparative desert might hold that A deserves twice as much as B. This 
conception of desert specifies a particular ratio between A’s desert and B’s deserts, and requires 
that the allocation of benefits be in harmony with this ratio.  
 
Strictly comparative desert can be graphically represented by a desert-line, specifying possible 
allocations of goods among A and B that have the appropriate ratio. For example, if we assume 
that A deserves twice as much as B it is possible to draw a desert-line in the efficiency 
framework. This line connects all allocations that give A twice as much as B. It is indicated in 
Figure 2.  
                                            
9 For example, see David Miller, "Comparative and Noncomparative Desert," Desert and Justice, 
ed. Serena Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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Figure 2 
 
Such a conception of desert is not at odds with efficiency. Any allocation that satisfies the 
deserved ratio is optimal from the perspective of desert. Hence one can simply select the efficient 
allocation that satisfies the deserved ratio. This allocation will be optimal from the perspectives of 
efficiency and desert, and no trade-offs are required. To find this allocation, one looks at the 
intersection of the desert-line and the Frontier. This can be done for cases with more than 2 
individuals as well, by expanding the number of dimensions. In the example we are considering, 
with a total endowment of 12 units of benefits, A should have 8 units and B should have 4. This 
can be surmised from Figure 2.10 In this way, the requirements of comparative desert and 
efficiency together specify a uniquely attractive allocation of benefits. Comparative desert and 
efficiency go together very well. Indeed, they need each other. Neither can specify a specific 
allocation. However, together they do produce a unique solution to the distributive problem.  
Alas, the same does not go for absolute desert. 
 
ABSOLUTE DESERT 
 
Absolute desert differs from comparative desert in that it requires a particular allocation of 
benefits rather than merely that a particular proportion be observed in the distribution. The idea 
behind absolute desert is that individuals deserve specific, cardinal amounts of benefits, by virtue 
of how they have behaved. Absolute desert is far more complicated from the perspective of 
efficiency. However, it has also been the beneficiary of rigorous analysis by Shelly Kagan. 
                                            
10 The Frontier is given by 
€ 
a =12 − b . The Desert line is given by 
€ 
a = 2b. Putting these two 
together yields 
€ 
b = 4  and 
€ 
a = 8. 
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Kagan’s great innovation is to conceive of desert in graphical terms.11 By modelling our intuitions 
about desert in a graph it becomes quite easy to integrate it into standard economic models, as I 
will demonstrate below. These so-called desert-curves chart the goodness of an allocation from 
the perspective of desert against various possible allocations. Kagan conceives of desert in 
absolute terms. The quantities of benefits12 one deserves are given exogenously, and in some 
cardinal measurement. Individuals are, by virtue of some characteristic they possess, assumed to 
deserve a certain number of units of benefits. Them having this amount of benefits would be the 
optimal outcome from the perspective of desert. If they have more or less benefits than they 
deserve, this is less good from the perspective of desert. Hence Kagan constructs the following 
graph.13 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The roof-like line is one individual’s desert-curve. It represents how good it would be if this 
individual had various levels of benefits. The level of benefits one deserves is represented by the 
highest point in the graph, or the peak. If the individual has less or more benefits than this 
optimum, this would be less good than him having the optimum, and so the curve slopes 
downwards from the peak on both sides. The more an individual deviates from his peak, the 
worse the outcome is, and the lower the relevant point on the graph. In this desert graph, we see 
two individuals, A and B. A deserves 10 units of some benefit, and B deserves 5. The slopes of 
the mountain are straight, and are assumed to have a slope of 1 or –1 on either side. This type of 
desert-curve is referred to as simple straight desert. Kagan also considers a few different types of 
desert-curve, and I will introduce these when I discuss their application to the economic 
framework under consideration.  But I will start with the simplest case, represented in Figure 3. 
 
The desert-curves specify an ideal distribution from the perspective of desert. One might 
represent this ideal distribution from the perspective of desert in Figure 2 with a star. Call this the 
sweetspot. It is the coordinate defined by the location of the peaks of A and B’s desert-curves. 
                                            
11 See Shelly Kagan, "Equality and Desert," What Do We Deserve?, eds. L Pojman and O 
McLeod (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
12 Kagan places welfare on the X-axis. However, for present purposes, placing benefits on the X-
axis is more convenient. Kagan explicitly allows this substitution, and it has no consequences for 
his argument. 
13 See Kagan, "Equality and Desert,", Section 3. 
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Given the fact that the conception of desert under consideration is absolute, and what people 
deserve is exogenously given, it can be anywhere in the figure; it need not be on the Frontier.  
 
Obviously, if the sweetspot happens to fall on the Frontier, desert and efficiency can both be 
satisfied, and this allocation would be optimal from the perspective of both desert and efficiency. 
However, there is no reason to assume that this would generally be the case. Hence it is already 
clear that desert and efficiency will often be in conflict. The distribution required by absolute 
desert will often be either inefficient, if the sweetspot lies within the Frontier, or infeasible, if it 
lies beyond the Frontier. And this is to be expected, given the fact that efficiency is a function of 
the available resources and absolute desert is not. It might be the case that when we have given 
everyone what they deserve, there are still some benefits left over. Efficiency requires that they 
not be wasted and distributed. However, from the perspective of desert, this would make matters 
worse, as it removes the distribution from the sweetspot. In this case a society dedicated to both 
ideals would have to find a compromise between the requirements of desert and efficiency. I will 
discuss this case later in the argument. 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
In the case presented in Figure 4, based on the desert-curves of Figure 3 and the resources of 
Figure 1, the opposite problem occurs. The sweetspot lies beyond the Frontier. This means that 
there are not enough benefits to give everyone what they deserve, and satisfying desert is 
infeasible.  Doing so would require 15 units of benefits, and there are only 12 units available. We 
must find a compromise. This allocation would be the least bad distribution from the perspective 
of desert that is efficient and hence feasible.  
 
ISOKAGANS 
 
In this context Kagan’s slopes are of great importance. They show how bad it is from the 
perspective of desert if individuals have more or less benefits than they deserve. Hence they may 
be used to construct what I will call IsoKagans. An IsoKagan connects a series of allocations that 
are equally bad from the perspective of desert. It should be conceptualised as an indifference 
curve for the concept of desert.  I say equally bad from the perspective of desert, because the 
points on an IsoKagan are all equally suboptimal from the perspective of desert. As such they 
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originate from the sweetspot, in a series of concentric figures. Their particular shape is 
determined by the shape of the desert-curves of the individuals, as these represent how bad 
particular deviations from the peak are from the perspective of desert. One interesting feature of 
IsoKagans is that, unlike indifference curves, they completely encircle the sweetspot. This is 
because desert does not only consider it suboptimal if individuals have less than their peak, but 
also if they have more than their optimum. As such, desert is indifferent between various 
individuals having either more or less than they deserve to some extent. 
 
To draw an IsoKagan, one must simply connect allocations that are equally bad from the 
perspective of desert. To measure this one should look at the desert-curves, and use them to 
determine how much an allocation deviates from desert. If we take an allocation of benefits 
among A and B, the amounts they receive can be looked up on the relevant desert-curves. 
Associated with the distributive share of each individual is a score on the vertical axis, i.e. in 
terms of the goodness of this outcome from the perspective of desert. The difference between the 
goodness associated with the peak and the goodness of the particular allocation under 
examination, represents how bad it is that the individual has more or less than he deserves. For a 
given allocation of benefits, one may sum these goodness deficits for all individuals, and this 
produces a measure of how bad a distribution is from the perspective of desert, which I call 
deviation-score. The lower the deviation-score, the closer an allocation is to the sweetspot, and 
hence the closer it is to desert. I give complete instructions for deriving IsoKagans in the 
Appendix, but for the argument I will only use intuitive arguments.  
 
In the example, I have assumed that if an individual has 1 unit of benefits less than he or she 
ideally deserves, this reduces the goodness of the distribution by 1 unit of goodness. This follows 
from the slope of the desert-curves. So an allocation of benefits that gives A 10 units of the good 
and B 2 units, results in a deviation-score of 3. An allocation that gives A 7 units and B 5 units, 
also has a score of 3, as does an allocation of 8.5 for A and 3.5 for B, or for that matter an 
allocation of 12 for A and 6 for B. Please note that the direction of the deviation does not matter. 
As such the deviation is always positive. If A has 9 and B has 9, the deviation-score of that 
allocation is 5, i.e. 1+4, and not 3, i.e. –1+4.  Connect all the allocations with an identical 
deviation-score and one has the IsoKagan for that score.  
 
Given the desert-curves in Figure 1, and in particular the fact that they are identical for both 
individuals, straight and symmetrical, the IsoKagans will take the shape of square diamonds, 
centred around the sweetspot. The slopes of the sides of the IsoKagans will be 1 or –1. This is the 
case for the simple reason that both individuals have identically shaped desert-curves. This means 
that taking one unit of benefits from the one, and giving it to the other, produces no change in 
deviation-score. I give a mathematical proof of this result in the Appendix. Different curves will 
produce differently shaped IsoKagans, and I will discuss these later. 
 
Armed with our IsoKagans, it becomes easy to see which feasible allocations are preferred from 
the perspective of desert. One simply takes the efficient allocation that is on the IsoKagan that is 
closest to the sweetspot, i.e. which touches the Frontier. This allocation represents the efficient 
and feasible allocation that is least bad from the perspective of desert. This would be the preferred 
allocation from the perspectives of desert and efficiency. 
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Figure 5 
 
However, note that the relevant section of the IsoKagan and the Frontier have the same slope of -
1. This will often be the case, as the Frontier will always have this slope, and the IsoKagan will 
have this slope if the desert-curves are straight, symmetrical and identical for both individuals.14 
This means that there is a whole series of allocations that are efficient and that lie on the same 
IsoKagan. Desert and efficiency are indifferent between the allocations on the overlap of the 
Frontier and the IsoKagan. 
 
THE Y-GAP VIEW 
 
One might further reduce the number of eligible allocations by introducing a consideration of 
comparative desert. This use of comparative desert is subsidiary to absolute desert, in that it 
presupposes that what individuals deserve is given in a cardinal amount. As such, it is quite 
distinct from comparative desert as it was encountered above. The idea of supplementary 
comparative desert is that individuals’ shares should be in proportion to the location of their 
peaks, i.e. they should deviate from their peaks to the same extent.15 This is justified by an appeal 
to fairness, or the idea that individuals’ claims should be satisfied to the same extent.16 It is an 
additional, and to some extent independent, concern that may serve as a tie-breaker in this 
context. For the IsoKagans only take into account the summed deviation from the peaks of the 
individuals, but not how the deviations are distributed. Supplementary comparative desert 
imposes the additional criterion that any deviation be equally shared. Of course, the idea needs 
further specification, and it has been elaborated in various fashions. Kagan himself has suggested 
                                            
14 Interestingly enough, the slopes of the desert-curves do not impact the shape of the IsoKagans, 
provided they are the same for all individuals. 
15 For example see Owen McLeod, "On the Comparative Element of Desert," Desert and Justice, 
ed. Serena Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
16 For example, see J Broome, "Fairness," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1991). 
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the Y-gap view.17 This holds that supplementary comparative desert is satisfied if two conditions 
are met. First of all, individuals must be on the same side of their peaks. This is obviously 
required. For if I have less than I deserve, comparative desert would hardly be satisfied if you 
were given more than you deserve. The direction of deviation from desert must be the same for 
all individuals concerned. The second condition, which gives the view its name, holds that 
individuals should be equally far from their peaks in terms of the Y-axis that measures the 
goodness from the perspective of desert. In Figure 6, B’ and A’ are equally good from the 
perspective of supplementary comparative desert, as both individuals are on the same side of their 
mountains and equally far from their peaks, measured in terms of goodness.18 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
An alternative view of supplementary comparative desert is the Ratio view, holding that 
comparative desert requires that the benefits individuals enjoy must be in proportion to the 
location of their peaks. The ratio of individuals’ peaks must be identical to the ratio of their 
amounts of benefits. For example, if A deserves 100 units of benefits and B deserves 50 units of 
benefits, then if B has 40 units, A should have 80 units. Kagan discusses this view in his 
Comparative Desert.19  It is rejected on the basis of the following case. Imagine A deserves –10, 
deserving a life not worth living20, and B deserves +20. Assume that A is at –5 and that this 
cannot be changed. According to the Ratio view, B should then have +10. But this would mean 
that comparative desert would give B less than she deserves because A has more than she 
deserves. In other words, if A has more than she deserves, the way to satisfy comparative desert 
according to the ratio view is to make B worse off. This is a perverse outcome, as it does not 
satisfy the basic intuition of supplementary comparative desert that if A has more than she 
deserves, B should have more than she deserves as well. Hence the ratio view must be mistaken. 
    
The Y-gap view requires that we select an allocation in which the deviations in goodness from the 
ideal distribution in terms of desert are the same for both individuals. On an IsoKagan, this is the 
allocation for which both individuals have more or less than they deserve to the same extent in 
                                            
17 Shelly Kagan, "Comparative Desert," Desert and Justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
18 Taken from Kagan, "Comparative Desert,", p. 111. 
19 Kagan, "Comparative Desert,", pp. 100-03. 
20 Kagan assumes that one can deserve a negative position, i.e. a life not worth living. 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 5(2), 2008, 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
12 
terms of goodness. So for the IsoKagan associated with a deviation-score of 3, the Y-gap view 
would privilege the allocation where both individuals shoulder an equal portion of the deviation. 
Both would have 1.5 units of goodness more or less than what they deserve. This means that 
every IsoKagan has 2 Y-Gap points, one for when individuals have more than they deserve, and 
one for when they have less than they deserve. Because of the requirement for supplementary 
comparative desert that deviations be in the same direction, allocations where one individual has 
more than he deserves and the other less are ruled out.     
 
One might construct a line linking all the Y-Gap points on the various IsoKagans. This Y-Gap 
line will intersect with the Frontier, and the allocation at this intersection is the Y-Gap point of 
the highest efficient IsoKagan. This allocation, which is efficient, satisfies supplementary 
comparative desert, and is the least bad from the perspective of absolute desert is the preferred 
allocation from the perspectives of efficiency and desert. In this particular example, the preferred 
allocation would be 8.5 units of benefits for A and 3.5 units for B. In this allocation efficiency is 
satisfied, as all 12 units are distributed and it is impossible to give to the one without taking from 
the other. But this allocation is also privileged by desert. It lies on the highest feasible IsoKagan, 
and both individuals have less than they deserve to the same extent, satisfying the Y-gap view of 
supplementary comparative desert. 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
INEFFICIENT DESERT 
 
So far, I have only considered cases where absolute desert is infeasible, i.e. where there are too 
few resources to give individuals what they deserve. This means that the only feasible 
distributions are sub-optimal from the perspective of desert, and we must select the allocation that 
is least bad from this perspective, allowing us to select an allocation that is both efficient and 
privileged by desert. However, desert might also be satisfied with less than all the available 
resources. For example, desert might require that A have 5 units of benefits and B have 3 units of 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 5(2), 2008, 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
13 
benefits. If there are still 12 units of benefits in society, desert can be satisfied with 8 units of 
benefits, and there will be 4 units left over. In this case desert would be satisfied with an 
inefficient distribution. The allocation is inefficient because in these cases it will always be 
possible to make one of the individuals better off with the left-over resources without making the 
other worse off. Efficiency requires that this be done, but this would make matters worse from the 
perspective of desert. If we gave all of the 4 units of surplus to A, this would be an improvement 
from the perspective of efficiency, but a worsening from the perspective of desert. In general, if 
the sweetspot lies within the Frontier, desert and efficiency are at odds.    
      
 
One possibility to overcome this conflict is to adopt a dynamic rather than a static perspective. It 
was noted that sometimes desert requires more resources than are available while at other times it 
requires that certain resources remain unallocated. It is possible to borrow and save resources so 
that desert can be satisfied in an inter-temporally efficient fashion. Suppose that 12 units of goods 
are available in period t. Also suppose that A deserves 7 units and B deserves 3 units, leaving 2 
units unallocated. Considered in isolation, distributing according to desert in period t may be 
inefficient. But now suppose that in period t+1, there are again 12 units available, but this time A 
deserves 5 units and B deserves 9 units, resulting in a shortage of 2 units. We may save the two 
units unallocated in t in order to cover the shortfall in t+1.  In this way long run efficiency can be 
combined with giving individuals what they deserve. However, this will not resolve the 
principled conflict between desert and efficiency. For there is no reason to suppose that in the 
long run the shortages and the surpluses will even out. What individuals absolutely deserve and 
what resources are available are separate and unrelated issues. Just as it may be the case in one 
time-period that desert and efficiency are not in conflict, because the sweetspot lies on the 
frontier, so too it may be the case that in the long run the surpluses and deficits even out. But in 
both cases this is a matter of fortuitous circumstance. This is not to be relied on. When we are not 
so lucky, the conflict between desert and efficiency resurfaces. As that might often be the case, it 
is interesting to investigate how that conflict is to be resolved. 
 
How this is to be done depends on one’s priorities. I do not take a position regarding whether 
desert or efficiency should enjoy priority, but seek to understand the consequences of the two 
possible views. If one believes desert to be more important than efficiency, then one simply 
allocates according to desert, and discards or saves any benefits left over. In this case one is 
willing to accept inefficiencies for the purposes of satisfying absolute desert. The solution in this 
case is simple.  However, one might also think it irrational to discard benefits that could be used 
to make individuals better off at no cost to anyone. If this is one’s position, one gives efficiency a 
lexical priority. In this case a satisfactory allocation must first of all be efficient. Only then do 
other considerations, such as desert in this context, come into play. Those of this persuasion 
might ask which efficient allocation is preferred from the perspective of absolute desert.   
 
The system of IsoKagans and Y-Gap points can help us here. Again one can construct a series of 
IsoKagans around the sweetspot. Assuming simple straight desert-curves, they will again take the 
shape of square diamonds, with a slope of –1 or 1. For each IsoKagan there will be 2 points that 
satisfy the requirements of subsidiary comparative desert, and these allow us to draw the Y-Gap 
line through the IsoKagans. This line will intersect with the Frontier, and this allocation will be 
the allocation that is efficient, with a minimum of deviation from the requirements of desert and 
which satisfies the requirements of supplementary comparative desert. This allocation seems to 
be preferred from the perspective of desert and efficiency, if the latter is given priority. See 
Figure 8.     
 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 5(2), 2008, 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
14 
 
Figure 8 
 
 
DIFFERENT CURVES 
 
I have shown how desert and efficiency can be conceptualised in one theoretical framework, and 
how to select allocations that are optimal, or at least preferred from the perspective of these two 
desiderata. This has been greatly aided by the fact that the Frontier and the relevant section of the 
IsoKagans have had the same slope. To generate this happy result I have made several 
assumptions, primarily about desert. In particular I have assumed that the desert-curves were of a 
specific shape. This is the standard shape Kagan uses to represent desert, and as such this is a 
warranted assumption. However, Kagan also considers different desert-curves. These different 
desert-curves produce different IsoKagans. For example, Kagan introduces the idea of simple 
curved desert represented by parabolic desert-curves, as well as the idea of the bell motion. I will 
now consider the implications of these different desert-curves for the framework I have set out. 
 
Simple curved desert is characterised by desert-curves that have a parabolic shape, as indicated in 
Figure 9.21 Simple curved desert represents the intuition that taking a unit of benefits from an 
individual, or giving a unit of benefits to an individual, matters more the further the individual is 
from his peak. This means that as individuals stray from their peaks, matters get exponentially 
worse from the perspective of desert. 
 
                                            
21 Kagan, "Equality and Desert,", p. 301. 
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Figure 9 
 
Simple curved desert also results in curved IsoKagans. Full proof is given in the Appendix, but it 
is easy to see that in cases of simple curved desert, the relationship between how far one is from 
the sweetspot and the associated loss of goodness is exponential. This relationship carries over in 
the IsoKagans. They will take the shape of a series of concentric circles around the sweetspot. To 
find the preferred efficient allocation, desert requires that one select the allocation on the Frontier 
that is on the best IsoKagan, as is indicated in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
Note that if the IsoKagan is circular, there will be one unique allocation that represents the best 
efficient allocation from the perspective of desert, i.e. where the highest IsoKagan meets the 
Frontier. Because of this, there is no need to take recourse to the idea of supplementary 
comparative desert. However, this does raise the question as to whether the allocation singled out 
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in this fashion satisfies the requirements of supplementary comparative desert, i.e. if it is on the 
Y-Gap line. This is indeed the case; the Frontier will have a slope of –1, so the IsoKagan will also 
have a slope of –1 where it touches the Frontier. This will only be the case if both individuals are 
equally far from their peak, measured in terms of goodness.22 So, in cases of simple curved 
desert, there will be a unique allocation that is efficient, is on the highest feasible IsoKagan, and 
satisfies supplementary comparative desert.  This is a very interesting conclusion because it 
shows that for simple curved desert, there is no conflict between minimising the deviation from 
perfect desert and supplementary comparative desert. As we shall see, this is not always the case 
for other types of desert.  
 
Another shape of desert-curve that Kagan introduces is characterised by the bell motion.23 
Although the curves have the same shape as what has been termed simple straight desert, they are 
tilted outwards. The intuition behind the bell motion is that it is worse for people who deserve 
little to have more than they deserve than it is for them to have less. Conversely, it is worse for 
those who deserve a lot to have less than they deserve than it is for them to have more than they 
deserve. The idea is that it is better to over-benefit saints than it is to short-change them, while 
sinners should rather be given less than they deserve than more.  If one accepts this intuition, the 
desert-curves would look like Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 
 
These desert-curves would result in a particular set of IsoKagans, which would be shaped in the 
form a series of concentric trapezoids. A proof is provided in the Appendix. This is because bell 
motion straight desert requires that deviations from desert in terms of benefits be given different 
weightings depending on the individuals in question, and which side of the peak they are on. 
Consider the desert-curves of Figure 11. They would result in IsoKagans like the one in Figure 
12.  
                                            
22 Assume that the IsoKagan is given by 
€ 
x 2 + y 2 =1. Then the slope is given by 
€ 
−
x
y . Setting this 
to –1, to match up with the Frontier, yields 
€ 
x = y , yielding a Y-Gap point, assuming both 
individuals are on the same side of their peaks. 
23 Kagan, "Equality and Desert,", p. 301. 
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Figure 12 
 
A deserves more than B, and for this reason, giving A one unit of benefits less than she deserves 
is worse than giving her one unit more than she deserves. This means that the points that are 
equally bad from the perspective of desert for A, will be closer on the south side of the sweetspot 
than on the north side of the sweetspot. Likewise, because B deserves less than A, giving B one 
unit of benefits less than he deserves is better than giving B one unit more than he deserves. This 
means that the IsoKagan will lie closer to the sweetspot on the east side of the sweetspot, than on 
the west side. This results in a trapezoid IsoKagan. 
 
When we put trapezoid IsoKagans into the efficiency framework, the highest feasible IsoKagan 
will select an efficient allocation, probably giving A exactly what she deserves, and giving B far 
less than he deserves. 
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Figure 13 
 
This allocation is the best efficient allocation from the perspective of bell motion straight desert. 
Interestingly enough, this allocation will not satisfy the requirements of supplementary 
comparative desert. For it does not share the deviation from desert equally among A and B; it is 
not a Y-Gap point. Any allocation that is efficient and lies on the Y-Gap line will be on a lower 
and less attractive IsoKagan. This means that the requirements of absolute and supplementary 
comparative desert are in conflict for bell motion straight desert. Hence one must decide whether 
to prioritize absolute desert over supplementary comparative desert. This is a very difficult issue, 
which requires further study, and which I cannot take up in this context. 
 
What I have said so far only applies in cases where there are only two individuals. However, it is 
easy enough to extend the model. In the case of three individuals, the Frontier takes the form of a 
slanted plane, and the IsoKagan takes the shape of a cube, which will have a side that has the 
same slope as the Frontier. The Y-gap method will again select a preferred allocation of goods. In 
the case of simple curved desert, the IsoKagan will be a sphere, with 1 point touching the 
Frontier. Bell motion straight desert produces a pyramid without its peak. These IsoKagans will, 
just like in the case of 2 dimensions, touch the Frontier, selecting an allocation. Mathematically it 
is easy to extend the method to infinitely larger populations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I have considered the relationship between desert and distributive efficiency. To 
facilitate this analysis I have integrated current theoretical work on desert into the economic 
theory of distributive efficiency. It allows us to see whether there are allocations that are optimal 
from the perspectives of desert and efficiency, as well as what allocations are second-best, when 
there are no optimal allocations. 
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The answers to these questions depend on how one conceives of desert. If one believes desert to 
be fundamentally comparative in nature, desert and efficiency can both be satisfied. This means 
that there will be an allocation that is both efficient and deserved. However, if one believes desert 
to be primarily absolute in nature, there will often be conflicts between the two desiderata. In 
these cases it will not be possible to satisfy both desert and efficiency. However, the system of 
IsoKagans and Y-Gap points allows us to see what the two ideals would require in a particular 
situation and to select an allocation that is normatively appealing from both the perspective of 
desert and efficiency. 
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APPENDIX – The Math Section 
DRAWING ISOKAGANS  
 
There are individuals, ia, ib, … in, among whom we are distributing a fixed number of 
units of benefits. They deserve a specified amount of benefits, defined by the 
sweetspot. This allocation is given by the peaks, p(ia), p(ib), …, p(in).  An allocation, 
A, gives individuals particular amounts of goods, a(ia) , a(ib) , …, a(in) .  
 
The desert function for an individual, df(in), will specify how much goodness, g, is 
associated with in having a particular allocation a(in). Call this ga(in). Filling in a(in) in 
the df(in) gives ga(in). The g for the peak is given by gp(in). So to determine how much 
goodness is lost by an individual having a(in) rather than p(in), one must take   
gp(in) - ga(in). This value is never negative, as the peak is defined as the highest point in the desert-
curve, and no allocation can be better than the peak, although it will be 0 if the allocation gives the 
individual what he or she deserves. 
 
Then the total Deviation score for allocation A , D(A), is given by 
D(A)= gp(ia)- ga(ia) + gp(ib) -ga(ib) + … + gp(in) - ga(in) 
If everyone gets what they deserve, the D(A) will be 0. The higher D(A) the less good A 
is from the perspective of desert. 
 
IsoKagans are collections of allocations that have the same Deviation score. By 
setting the formula for the Deviation score to a certain value, we can chart the 
IsoKagan.  
D(A)= gp(ia)- ga(ia) + gp(ib) -ga(ib) + … + gp(in) - ga(in)=k 
SUPPLEMENTARY COMPARATIVE DESERT 
 
To select allocations that satisfy the requirements of comparative desert, the Y-Gap 
view of comparative desert imposes two further requirements. They allow us to 
select Y-Gap points.  
 
1 All individuals must be on the same side of their peaks.  
2 All individuals must suffer the same deviation from their peak, measured in terms 
of goodness. This requires 
 gp(ia)- ga(ia) = gp(ib) -ga(ib) = … = gp(in) - ga(in) 
 
Allocations which satisfy these conditions satisfy the requirements of supplementary 
comparative desert. They may be connected to draw the Y-Gap line. 
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Example of simple straight desert IsoKagans. 
Simple straight desert is characterised by desert-curves that have constant slopes on 
either side of the peaks, are symmetrical relative to their peaks and are identical for 
both individuals. As such, they are discontinuous functions, and we must consider 
each side of each peak separately. This means that the D will be computed differently 
for each quadrant relative to the Sweetspot, S. I will assume the following desert-
curves, with a peak for ia at p(ia)=10, and for ib at p(ib)=5. The slopes are 1 and –1 
on either side, and the peaks have a goodness value of gp(in)= 5. This corresponds to 
the example discussed in the main text. 
df(ia) :   ga(ia)=a(ia)-5     if a(ia) ≤10 
  ga(ia)= 15- a(ia)  if a(ia)≥10 
df(ib):  g a(ib)=a(ib)  if a(ib)≤5 
  g a(ib)= 10- a(ib) if a(ib)≥5 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≤10 and a(ib)≤5, D = 1 yields 
D=5-(a(ia)-5) + 5- a(ib) = 1 
a(ia) = 14- a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of –1 for the SouthEast Quadrant. 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≤10 and a(ib)≥5, D=1 yields 
D=5-(a(ia)-5) +5-(10-a(ib)) = 1 
a(ia)= 4+a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of 1 for the SouthWest Quadrant. 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≥10 and a(ib)≥5, D=1 yields 
D=5-(15 -a(ia)) +5-(10-a(ib)) = 1 
a(ia)= 16-a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of -1 for the NorthWest Quadrant. 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≥10 and a(ib)≤5, D=1 yields 
D=5-(15 -a(ia)) +5-a(ib) = 1 
a(ia)= 6+a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of 1 for the NorthEast Quadrant. 
Together, these functions define a square diamond IsoKagan. 
 
 
 
Example of simple curved desert IsoKagans. 
Simple curved desert is defined by desert-curves that have a parabolic shape, are 
symmetrical relative to the peak, and are identical for both individuals. They may be 
viewed as a continuous function, and we will not have to consider each quadrant 
separately. I will consider simple quadratic desert-curves, with a peak for ia at 
p(ia)=10, and for ib at p(ib)=5. Both peaks are associated with a level of goodness of 
gp(in)=5. This follows the example given in the main text. 
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In this case of simple curved desert the Desert functions, df are: 
df(ia):  ga(ia)=-(a(ia)-10)2+5 
df(ib):  ga(ib)=-(a(ib)-5)2+5 
 
The deviations for the individuals are given by 
Da(ia) = 5 –(-a(ia)2+20a(ia)-95) 
Da(ib)= 5 – (-a(ib)2+10a(ib)-20) 
Setting D=1 gives 
D= a(ia)2-20a(ia)+100 + a(ib)2-10a(ib)+25 = 1 
This may be rewritten as 
(a(ia) –10)2 + (a(ib)-5)2=1 
This describes a circular IsoKagan, with r=1 and with an origin in the sweetspot 
where a(ia)=10 and a(ib)=5. 
 
 
Example of bell motion straight desert IsoKagans. 
In bell motion straight desert, df is different depending on where we are relative to S. 
Recall that the intuition behind the bell motion is that it is worse for people who 
deserve little to have more than they deserve than it is for them to have less. 
Conversely, it is worse for those who deserve a lot to have less than they deserve 
than it is for them to have more than they deserve. Hence bell motion uses different 
df’s, depending on how deserving individuals are, and where they are relative to S. 
As such the desert-curves are discontinuous, as in the case of simple straight desert. I 
will assume the following desert-curves, with a peak for ia at p(ia)=10, and for ib at 
p(ib)=5. The peaks have a goodness value of gp(in)=5. This corresponds to the 
example discussed in the main text. 
 
df(ia) :   g a(ia)=2a(ia)-15    if a(ia) ≤10 
  g a(ia)= 15- a(ia)  if a(ia)≥10 
df(ib):  ga(ib)=a(ib)  if a(ib)≤5 
  ga(ib)= 15-2a(ib) if a(ib)≥5 
  
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≤10 and a(ib)≤5, D = 1 yields 
D=5-(2a(ia)-15) + 5- a(ib) = 1 
a(ia) = 12-0.5a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of –0.5 for the SouthEast Quadrant. 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≤10 and a(ib)≥5, D=1 yields 
D=5-(2a(ia)-15) +5-(15-2a(ib)) = 1 
a(ia)= 4.5+a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of 1 for the SouthWest Quadrant. 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≥10 and a(ib)≥5, D=1 yields 
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D=5-(15 -a(ia)) +5-(15-2a(ib)) = 1 
a(ia)= 21-2a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of -2 for the NorthWest Quadrant. 
For the quadrant in which a(ia)≥10 and a(ib)≤5, D=1 yields 
D=5-(15 -a(ia)) +5-a(ib) = 1 
a(ia)= 6+a(ib) 
This produces a straight IsoKagan with a slope of 1 for the NorthEast Quadrant. 
Together, these functions define a trapezoid IsoKagan. 
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